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An Information-theoretic Approach to Privacy
Lalitha Sankar, S. Raj Rajagopalan, and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract— Ensuring the usefulness of electronic data sources
while providing necessary privacy guarantees is an impor-
tant unsolved problem. This problem drives the need for
an overarching analytical framework that can quantify the
safety of personally identifiable information (privacy) while still
providing a quantifable benefit (utility) to multiple legitimate
information consumers. State of the art approaches have
predominantly focused on privacy. This paper presents the
first information-theoretic approach that promises an analytical
model guaranteeing tight bounds of how much utility is possible
for a given level of privacy and vice-versa.
I. THE DATABASE PRIVACY PROBLEM
Information technology and electronic communications
have been rapidly applied to almost every sphere of human
activity, including commerce, medicine and social network-
ing. The concomitant emergence of myriad large centralized
searchable data repositories has made “leakage” of private
information such as medical data, credit card information,
or social security numbers via data correlation (inadvertently
or by malicious design) highly probable and thus an impor-
tant and urgent societal problem. Unlike the well-studied
secrecy problem (e.g., [1]–[3]) in which the protocols or
primitives make a sharp distinction between secret and non-
secret data, in the privacy problem, disclosing data provides
informational utility while enabling possible loss of privacy
at the same time. In fact, in the course of a legitimate
transaction, a user learns some public information, which
is allowed and needs to be supported for the transaction to
be meaningful, but at the same time he can also learn/infer
private information, which needs to be prevented. Thus
every user is (potentially) also an adversary. This drives
the need for a unified analytical framework that can tell
us unequivocally and precisely how safe private data can
be (privacy) and simultaneously provide measurable benefit
(utility) to multiple legitimate information consumers.
It has been noted that utility and privacy are competing
goals: perfect privacy can be achieved by publishing nothing
at all, but this has no utility; perfect utility can be obtained
by publishing the data exactly as received, but this offers
no privacy [4]. Utility of a data source is potentially (but
not necessarily) degraded when it is restricted or modified
to uphold privacy requirements. The central problem of this
paper is a precise quantification of the tradeoff between the
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privacy needs of the respondents (individuals represented by
the data) and the utility of the sanitized (published) data for
any data source.
Though the problem of privacy and information leakage
has been studied for several decades by multiple research
communities (e.g., [4]–[8] and the references therein), the
proposed solutions have been both heuristic and application-
specific. The recent groundbreaking theory of ǫ-differential
privacy [9] from the theoretical computer science community
provides the first universal metric of privacy that applies
to any numerical database. We seek to address the open
question of a universal and analytical characterization that
provides a tight privacy-utility tradeoff using tools and tech-
niques from information theory.
Rate distortion theory is a natural choice to study the
utility-privacy tradeoff; utility can be quantified via fidelity
which, in turn, is related to distortion, and privacy can be
quantified via equivocation. Our key insight is captured in
the following theorem which is presented in this paper: for
a data source with private and public data, minimizing the
information disclosure rate sufficiently to satisfy the desired
utility for the public data is equivalent to maximizing the pri-
vacy for the private data. In a sparsely referenced paper [10]
from three decades ago, Yamamoto developed the tradeoff
between rate, distortion, and equivocation for a specific and
simple source model. In this paper, we show via the above
summarized theorem that Yamamoto’s formalism can be
translated into the language of data disclosure. Furthermore,
we develop a framework that allows us to model data sources,
specifically databases, develop application independent util-
ity and privacy metrics, quantify the fundamental bounds on
the utility-privacy tradeoffs, and develop a side-information
model for dealing with questions of external knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows. We present channel
model and preliminaries in Section II. The main result and
the proof are developed in Section III. We discuss the results
and present numerical examples in Section IV. We conclude
in Section V.
II. THE DATABASE PRIVACY PROBLEM
A. Problem Definition
While the problem of quantifying the utility/privacy prob-
lem applies to all types of data sources, we start our
study with databases because they are highly structured and
historically better studied than other types of sources. A
database is a table (matrix) whose rows represent individual
entries and whose columns represent the attributes of each
entry [5]. For example, the attributes of each entry in a
healthcare database typically include name, address, social
security number (SSN), gender, and a collection of medical
information, and each entry contains the information per-
taining to an individual. Messages from a user to a database
are called queries and, in general, result in some numeric
or non-numeric information from the database termed the
response.
The goal of privacy protection is to ensure that, to the
extent possible, the user’s knowledge is not increased beyond
strict predefined limits by interacting with the database.
The goal of utility provision is, generally, to maximize the
amount of information that the user can receive. Depending
on the relationships between attributes, and the distribution
of the actual data, a response may contain information that
can be inferred beyond what is explicitly included in the
response. The privacy policy defines the information that
should not be revealed explicitly or by inference to the user
and depends on the context and the application. For example,
in a database on health statistics, attributes such as name
and SSN may be considered private data, whereas in a state
motor vehicles database only the SSN is considered private.
The challenge for privacy protection is to design databases
such that responses do not reveal information contravening
the privacy policy.
B. Current Approaches and Metrics
The problem of privacy in databases has a long and rich
history stretching back to the 1970s and space restrictions
preclude any attempt to do full justice to the different
approaches that have been considered along the way. While
there have been many heuristic approaches to privacy, we
only present the major milestones in privacy research on
creating quantitative privacy metrics. Since privacy is a
requirement that appears in many diverse contexts, a robust
and formal notion of privacy that satisifies most, if not all,
requirements is a tricky proposition and there have been
many attempts at a definition. The reader is referred to the
excellent survey by Dwork [11] for a detailed history of the
field. The problem of privacy was first exposed by census
statisticians who were required to publish statistics related to
census functions but without revealing any particulars of in-
dividuals in the census databases. An early work by Dalenius
[6] reveals the depth to which this problem was considered.
Several early attempts were made to publish census data
using ad hoc techniques such as sub-sampling. However,
the first widely reported attempt at a formal definition of
privacy was by Sweeney [7]. The concept of k-anonymity
proposed by Sweeney captures the intuitive notion of privacy
that every individual entry should be indistinguishable from
(k−1) other entries for some large value of k. This notion of
anonymity for database respondents is analogous to similar
proposals that were made for anonymity on the Internet
such as crowds [12]. More recently, researchers in the data
mining community have proposed to quantify the privacy
loss resulting from data disclosure as the mutual information
between attribute values in the original and perturbed data
sets, both modeled as random variables [8].
The approaches considered in the literature have centered
on the correct application of perturbation (also called san-
itization), which encompasses a general class of database
modification techniques that ensure that a user interacts only
with a modified database that is derived from the original
(e.g.: [4], [6]–[8]). Most of the these perturbation approaches,
with the exception of differential privacy-based ones, are
heuristic and application-specific and often focus on additive
noise approaches.
Differential privacy: More recently, privacy approaches
for statistical databases has been driven by the differential
privacy definition [9], [13]–[15]. In these papers, the authors
take the view that privacy of an individual in a database
is related to the ability of an adversary to detect whether
that individual’s data is in that database or not. Motivated
by cryptographic models, they formalize this intuition by
defining the difference in the adversary’s outputs when
presented with two databases D and D′ that are identical
except in one row.
Definition 1 ( [11]): A function K gives ǫ-differential pri-
vacy if for all databases D,D′ defined as above, and all S ⊆
Range(K),
Pr[K(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) · Pr
[
K
(
D
′
)
∈ S
]
(1)
where the probability space in each case is over the coin flips
of K.
It is important to make two observations regarding the
above definition. First, the probabilities in definition 1 are
over the actions of the function K and not over the distri-
bution of D; in other words, the definition is independent
of the distribution from which D may be sampled. Second,
Definition 1 guarantees that the presence or absence of an
individual row in the database makes very little difference to
the output of the adversary as required, and thus, provides a
precise privacy guarantee to any individual in the database.
More recently, Dwork et al. [15] also provide a mechanism
for achieving ǫ-differential privacy universally for statistical
queries (queries that map subsets of database entries to real
numbers) which we summarize below. Let Z ∼ Lap(b)
represent a Laplacian distributed random variable with pa-
rameter b. If b = 1/ǫ we have that the density at z is
proportional to exp(−4|z|) and for any (z, z′) such that
|z− z′| ≤ 1, Pr(z) and Pr(z′) are within a factor of eǫ. The
following proposition shows that it is possible to achieve
ǫ-differential privacy for a given statistical query class for
suitable choice of the Laplacian parameter.
Proposition 1 ( [15] ): For any statistical query f : D →
R, the mechanism L that adds independently generated noise
to the output terms with distribution Lap(∆f/ ǫ) guarantees
ǫ-differential privacy where ∆f = max
∣∣∣f(D)− f(D′)∣∣∣ for
D, D
′
which are different in exactly one row.
Proposition 1 is the most significant milestone in the
theory of privacy because it provides a method to guarantee
a strong but quantifiable notion of privacy for statistical
databases independent of their content. Furthermore, the
noise distribution can be chosen after seeing the query, so
that the noise level can be adjusted adaptively when pre-
sented with a sequence of queries. However, one constraint
in using Proposition 1 to define ǫ is that ∆f may be difficult
to estimate – a loose bound on ∆f may result in an overly
large ǫ, thereby resulting in a possible degradation of utility.
To date, privacy has been the main focus of most work
in this area. Indeed, Dwork [9] says explicitly that privacy
is paramount in their work. However, databases exist to be
useful and implementing sanitization techniques may hurt
the usefulness of the database while safeguarding privacy.
In much of the earlier work on database privacy, the utility
is implicit. For exmple, Sweeney assumes that the databases
can be k-anonymized and still maintain usefulness. However,
without a relationship between k and some formal notion
of usefulness, it is impossible to say what a reasonable
value of k should be in reality. Similarly, utility in privacy-
preserving techniques such as clustering [4] and histograms
[16] is assumed to be guaranteed as a direct result of
the methods used; for example, in [16] it is shown that
approximation algorithms that can run on original histograms
can also run on the sanitized histograms with a degradation
of performance. Clustering, a common sanitization technique
[4], [17], [18], is claimed to maintain utility as a result of the
following property: all points in a cluster are mapped to the
cluster center, so no point is moved more than the diameter
of the largest cluster.
The differential privacy model uses additive noise for
sanitization which in turn suggests a utility metric related
to the accuracy of the sanitized database. The Laplacian
noise model was chosen for achieving differential privacy
in part because the mean and mode are zero, in which case
no noise is added in most cases. The privacy parameter ǫ
is inversely related to the variance of the added noise – a
better privacy guarantee requires a smaller ǫ which in turn
implies higher variance. The accuracy of a sanitized database
as a whole is inversely related to the privacy requirement.
Determining the appropriate range of ǫ so that both privacy
and accuracy requirements are balanced requires knowledge
of the specific application. As an example, in the case of
learning, recent results [19] in the area of private learning
bound the extent to which the performance (i.e. accuracy) of
certain kinds of classifers degrade when the training data is
sanitized using the L mechanism in Proposition 1. In such
cases, it is possible to have both, differential privacy with a
known ǫ, as well as quantified utility loss for the application
under consideration.
C. Privacy vs. Secrecy
It is important to contrast the privacy problem from
the well-studied (cryptographic and information-theoretic)
secrecy problem where the task is to stop specific information
from being received by untrusted third parties (eavesdrop-
pers, wire-tappers, and other kinds of adversaries). In the
private information retrieval model [20], the privacy problem
is inverted in that the adversary is the database from whom
the user wants to keep his query secret. In the secure
multi-party computation model [21], each player wishes to
keep his entire input secret from the other players while
jointly computing a function on all the inputs. In all these
problems, a specific data item is clearly either secret or
public, whereas in the privacy problem, the same data while
providing informational utility to the user can reveal private
information about the individuals represented by the data.
This eliminates the possibility of using secrecy techniques
such as a specific model of the adversary or of harnessing
any computing [22] or physical advantages such as secret
keys, channel differences, or side information [23].
III. AN INFORMATION-THEORETIC APPROACH
A. Model for Databases
Circumventing the semantic issue: In general, utility and
privacy metrics tend to be application specific. Focusing our
efforts on developing an analytical model, we propose to cap-
ture a canonical database model and representative abstract
metrics. Such a model will circumvent the classic privacy
issues related to the semantics of the data by assuming
that there exist forward and reverse maps of the data set
to the proposed abstract format (for e.g., a string of bits or a
sequence of real values). Such mappings are often implicitly
assumed in the privacy literature [4], [8], [9]; our motivation
for making it explicit is to separate the semantic issues from
the abstraction and apply Shannon-theoretic techniques.
Model: Our proposed model focuses on large databases
with K attributes per entry. Let Xk ∈ Xk be a random
variable denoting the kth attribute, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, and
let X ≡ (X1, X2, . . . , XK). A database d with n rows is
a sequence of n independent observations of X from the
distribution
pX (x) = pX1X2...XK (x1, x2, . . . , xK) (2)
which is assumed to be known to both the designers and
users of the database. Our simplifying assumption of row
independence holds generally (but not always) as correlation
is typically across attributes and not across entries. We write
X
n = (Xn1 , X
n
2 , . . . , X
n
K) to denote the n independent
observations of X. This database model is universal in the
sense that most practical databases can be mapped to this
model.
A joint distribution in (2) models the fact that the attributes
in general are correlated and can reveal information about
one another. In addition to the revealed information, a user
of a database can have access to correlated side informa-
tion from other information sources. We model the side-
information as an n-length sequence Zn which is correlated
with the database entries via a joint distribution pXZ (x,z) .
Public and private variables: We consider a general model
in which some attributes need to be kept private while the
source can reveal a function of some or all of the attributes.
We write Kr and Kh to denote sets of private (subscript h
for hidden) and public (subscript r for revealed) attributes,
respectively, such that Kr ∪ Kh = K ≡{1, 2, . . . ,K}. We
further denote the corresponding collections of public and
private attributes by Xr ≡ {Xk}k∈Kr and Xh ≡ {Xk}k∈Kh ,
respectively. Our notation allows for an attribute to be both
public and private; this is to account for the fact that a
database may need to reveal a function of an attribute while
keeping the attribute itself private. In general, a database
can choose to keep public (or private) one or more attributes
(K > 1). Irrespective of the number of private attributes,
a non-zero utility results only when the database reveals an
appropriate function of some or all of its attributes.
Special cases: For K = 1, the lone attribute of each entry
(row) is both public and private, and thus, we have X ≡
Xr ≡ Xh. Such a model is appropriate for data mining
[8]; for a more general case in which Kh = Kr = K , we
obtain a model for census [4], [6] data sets in which utility
generally is achieved by revealing a function of every entry
of the database while simultaneously ensuring that no entry
is perfectly revealed. For K = 2 and Kh ∪ Kr = K and
Kh ∩ Kr = ∅, we obtain the Yamamoto model in [10].
B. Metrics: The Privacy and Utility Principle
Even though utility and privacy measures tend to be spe-
cific to the application, there is a fundamental principle that
unifies all these measures in the abstract domain. The aim
of a privacy-preserving database is to provide some measure
of utility to the user while at the same time guaranteeing a
measure of privacy for the entries in the database.
A user perceives the utility of a perturbed database to be
high as long as the response is similar to the response of
the unperturbed database; thus, the utility is highest of an
unperturbed database and goes to zero when the perturbed
database is completely unrelated to the original database.
Accordingly, our utility metric is an appropriately chosen
average ‘distance’ function between the original and the
perturbed databases. Privacy, on the other hand, is maximized
when the perturbed response is completely independent of
the data. Our privacy metric measures the difficulty of
extracting any private information from the response, i.e.,
the amount of uncertainty or equivocation about the private
attributes given the response.
C. Utility-Privacy Tradeoffs
1) A Privacy-Utility Tradeoff Model: We now propose a
privacy-utility model for databases. Our primary contribution
is demonstrating the equivalence between the database pri-
vacy problem and a source coding problem with additional
privacy constraints. A primary motivation for our approach
is the observation that database sanitization is traditionally
the process of distorting the data to achieve some measure
of privacy. For our abstract universal database model, san-
itization is thus a problem of mapping a set of database
entries to a different set subject to specific utility and privacy
requirements.
Our notation below relies on this abstraction. Recall that
a database d with n rows is an instantiation of Xn. Thus,
we will henceforth refer to a real database d as an input
sequence and to the corresponding sanitized database (SDB)
d′ as an output sequence. When the user has access to side
information, the reconstructed sequence at the user will in
general be different from the SDB sequence.
Our coding scheme consists of an encoder FE which
is a mapping from the set of all input sequences (i.e., all
databases d chosen from an underlying distribution) to a set
of indices W ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,M} and an associated table of
output sequences (each of which is a d′) with a one-to-one
mapping to the set of indices given by
FE : (X
n
1 ×X
n
2 × . . .×X
n
k )k∈Kenc →W ≡ {SDBk}
M
k=1
(3)
where Kr ⊆ Kenc ⊆ K and M = 2nR is the number of
output (sanitized) sequences created from the set of all input
sequences. The encoding rate R is the number of bits per row
(without loss of generality, we assume n rows in d and d′) of
the sanitized database. The encoding FE in (3) includes both
public and private attributes in order to model the general
case in which the sanitization depends on a subset of all
attributes.
A user with a view of the SDB (i.e., an index w ∈ W
for every d) and with access to side information Zn, whose
entries Zi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, take values in the alphabet Z ,
reconstructs the database d′ via the mapping
FD :W ×Z
n →
{
xˆ
n
r,m
}M
m=1
∈
(∏
k∈Kr
Xˆnk
)
(4)
where Xˆnr = FD (FE (Xn)).
A database may need to satisfy multiple utility constraints
for different (disjoint) subsets of attributes, and thus, we
consider a general framework with L ≥ 1 utility functions
that need to be satisfied. Relying on the distance based utility
principle, we model the lth utility, l = 1, 2, . . . , L, via the
requirement that the average distortion ∆l of the revealed
variables is upper bounded, for some ǫ > 0, as
ul : ∆l ≡ E
[
1
n
∑n
i=1g
(
Xr,i, Xˆr,i
)]
≤ Dl + ǫ,
l = 1, 2, . . . , L, (5)
where g (·, ·) denotes a distortion function, E is the ex-
pectation over the joint distribution of (Xr , Xˆr), and the
subscript i in Xr,i and Xˆr,i denotes the ith entry of Xnr
and Xˆnr , respectively. Examples of distance-based distortion
functions include the Euclidean distance for Gaussian dis-
tributed database entries, the Hamming distance for binary
input and output sequences, and the Kullback-Leibler (K-L)
‘distance’ comparing the input and output distributions.
Having argued that a quantifiable uncertainty captures the
underlying privacy principle of a database, we model the
uncertainty or equivocation about the private variables using
the entropy function as
p : ∆p ≡
1
n
H (Xnh |W,Z
n) ≥ E − ǫ, (6)
i.e., we require the average number of uncertain bits per
entry to be lower bounded by E. The case in which side
information is not available at the user is obtained by simply
setting Zn = 0 in (4) and (6).
The utility and privacy metrics in (5) and (6), respectively,
capture two aspects of our universal model: a) both represent
averages by computing the metrics across all database instan-
tiations d, and b) the metrics bound the average distortion and
privacy per entry. Thus, as the likelihood of the non-typical
sequences decreases exponentially with increasing n (very
large databases), these guarantees apply nearly uniformly to
all (typical) entries. Our general model also encompasses
the fact that the exact mapping from the distortion and
equivocation domains to the utility and privacy domains,
respectively, can depend on the application domain. We write
D ≡ (D1, D2, . . . , DL) and ∆ ≡ (∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆L). Based
on our notation thus far, we define the utility-privacy tradeoff
region as follows.
Definition 2: The utility-privacy tradeoff region T is the
set of all feasible utility-privacy tuples (D,E) for which
there exists a coding scheme (FE , FD) given by (3) and (4),
respectively, with parameters (n,M,∆,∆p) satisfying the
constraints in (5) and (6).
2) Equivalence of Utility-Privacy and Rate-Distortion-
Equivocation: We now present an argument for the equiv-
alence of the above utility-privacy tradeoff analysis with a
rate-distortion-equivocation analysis of the same source. For
the database source model described here, a classic lossy
source coding problem is defined as follows.
Definition 3: The set of tuples (R,D) is said to be feasi-
ble (achievable) if there exists a coding scheme given by (3)
and (4) with parameters (n,M,∆) satisfying the constraints
in (5) and a rate constraint
M ≤ 2n(R+ǫ). (7)
When an additional privacy constraint in (6) is included,
the source coding problem becomes one of determining
the achievable rate-distortion-equivocation region defined as
follows.
Definition 4: The rate-distortion-equivocation region R is
the set of all tuples (R,D,E) for which there exists a coding
scheme given by (3) and (4) with parameters (n,M,∆,∆p)
satisfying the constraints in (5), (6), and (7). The set of
all feasible distortion-equivocation tuples (D,E) is denoted
by RD−E , the equivocation-distortion function in the D-E
plane is denoted by Γ(D), and the distortion-equivocation
function which quantifies the rate as a function of both D
and E is denoted by R (D,E).
Thus, a rate-distortion-equivocation code is by definition a
(lossy) source code satisfying a set of distortion constraints
that achieves a specific privacy level for every choice of the
distortion tuple. In the following theorem, we present a basic
result capturing the precise relationship between T and R.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analytical result
that quantifies a tight relationship between utility and privacy.
We briefly sketch the proof here; details can be found in [24].
Theorem 1: For a database with a set of utility and privacy
metrics, the tightest utility-privacy tradeoff region T is the
distortion-equivocation region RD−E .
Proof: The crux of our argument is the fact that for
any feasible utility level D, choosing the minimum rate
R (D,E), ensures that the least amount of information is
revealed about the source via the reconstructed variables.
This in turn ensures that the maximum privacy of the private
attributes is achieved for that utility since, in general, the
public and private variables are correlated. For the same
set of utility constraints, since such a rate requirement is
not a part of the utility-privacy model, the resulting privacy
achieved is at most as large as that in RD−E (see Fig. 1(a)).
Implicit in the above argument is the fact that a utility-
privacy achieving code does not perform any better than
a rate-distortion-equivocation code in terms of achieving a
lower rate (given by log2M/n) for the same distortion and
privacy constraints. We can show this by arguing that if such
a code exists then we can always find an equivalent source
coding problem for which the code would violate Shannon’s
source coding theorem [25]. An immediate consequence of
this is that a distortion-constrained source code suffices to
preserve a desired level of privacy; in other words, the utility
constraints require revealing data which in turn comes at a
certain privacy cost that must be borne and vice-versa. We
capture this observation in Fig. 1(b) where we contrast exist-
ing privacy-exclusive and utility-exclusive regimes (extreme
points of the utility-privacy tradeoff curve) with our more
general approach of determining the set of feasible utility-
privacy tradeoff points.
From an information-theoretic perspective, the power of
Theorem 1 is that it allows us to study the larger problem
of database utility-privacy tradeoffs in terms of a relatively
familiar problem of source coding with privacy constraints.
As noted previously, this problem has been studied for a
specific source model by Yamamoto and here we expand his
elegant analysis to arbitrary database models including those
with side information at the user. Rate for the database can
be interpreted as the number of revealed information bits
(precision) per row. Our result shows the tight relationship
between utility, privacy, and precision – fixing the value of
any one determines the other two; for example, fixing the
utility (distortion D) precisely quantifies the maximal privacy
Γ(D) and the minimal precision R(D,E) for any E bounded
by Γ(D).
3) Capturing the Effects of Side-Information: It has been
illustrated that when a user has access to an external data
source (which is not part of the database under consideration)
the level of privacy that can be guaranteed changes [7], [9].
We cast this problem in information-theoretic terms as a side
information problem.
In an extended version [24] of this work, we develop the
tightest utility-privacy tradeoff region for the three cases of
a) no side information (L = 1 case studied in [10]), b)
side information only at the user, and c) side information
at both the source (database) and the user. We present a
result for the case with side information at the user only
and for simplicity, we assume a single utility function, i.e.,
L = 1. The proof uses an auxiliary random variable U along
the lines of source coding with side information [26] and
bounds the equivocation just as in [10, Appendix 1]. The
following theorem defines the bounds on the region R in
Definition 4 via the functions Γ(D) and R(D,E) where
Distortion D
Equivocation E
Rate distortion:
( ) ( ,0)R D R D≡
( , )R D E
Privacy bound: ( )DΓ
Rate Bound: ( , )R D E
Feasible Distortion-Equivocation 
region .D E−R
maxD
Privacy p
Utility U
Distortion D
Privacy-ignorant
Region
Privacy-exclusive
Region (current art)
Our Approach:
Utility-Privacy 
Tradeoff Region
Equivocation E
(a): Rate-Distortion-Equivocation Region (b): Utility-Privacy Tradeoff Region
Fig. 1. (a) Rate Distortion Equivocation Region; (b) Utility-Privacy Tradeoff Region.
Γ(D) bounds the maximal achievable privacy and R(D,E)
is the minimal information rate (see Fig. 1(a)) for very large
databases (n→∞). The proof follows along the lines of
Yamamoto’s proof in [10, Appendix 1] and is skipped in the
interest of space.
Theorem 2: For a database with side information available
only at the user, the functions Γ(D) and R (D,E) and the
regions RD−E and R are given by
Γ (D) = sup
p(xr,xh)p(u|xr,xh)∈P(D)
H(Xh|UZ) (8)
R (D,E) = inf
p(xr,xh)p(u|xr,xh)∈P(D,E)
I(XhXr;U)− I(Z;U)
(9)
RD−E = {(D,E) : D ≥ 0, 0 ≤ E ≤ Γ (D)} (10)
R = {(R,D,E) : D ≥ 0, 0 ≤ E ≤ Γ (D) , R ≥ R (D,E)}
(11)
where P (D,E) is the set of all p(xr,xh, z)p(u|xr,xh) such
that E [d (Xr, g (U,Z))] ≤ D and H(Xh|UZ) ≥ E, while
P (D) is defined as
P (D) ≡
⋃
H(Xh|XrZ)≤E≤H(Xh|Z)
P (D,E) . (12)
While Theorem 2 applies to a variety of database mod-
els, it is extremely useful in quantifying the utility-privacy
tradeoff for the following special cases of interest.
i) The single database problem (i.e., no side information):
SDB is revealed. Here, we have Z = 0 and U = Xˆr, i.e.,
the reconstructed vectors seen by the user are the same as
the SDB vectors.
ii) Completely hidden private variables: Privacy is com-
pletely a function of the statistical relationship between
public, private, and side information data. The expression for
R(D,E) in (9) assumes the most general model of encoding
both the private and the public variables. When the private
variables can only be deduced from the revealed variables,
i.e., Xh − Xr − U is a Markov chain, the expression for
R(D,E) in (9) will simplify to the Wyner-Ziv source coding
formulation [26], thus clearly demonstrating that the privacy
of the hidden variables is a function of both the correlation
between the hidden and revealed variables and the distortion
constraint.
iii) Census and data mining problems without side infor-
mation: Information rate completely determines the degree
of privacy achievable. For Z = 0, setting Xr = Xh ≡ X
(such that U = Xˆ), we obtain the census/data mining
problem discussed earlier. In general, due to an additional
equivocation constraint, R(D,E) ≥ R(D); however, for this
case in which all the attributes in the database are public,
since Γ(D) = H(X)−R(D,E) ≤ H(X)−R(D), and R(D)
is achievable using a rate-distortion code, the largest possible
equivocation is also achievable. Our analysis thus formalizes
the intuition in [8] for using the mutual information as an
estimate of the privacy lost. However in contrast to [8] in
which the underlying perturbation model is an additive noise
model, we assume a perturbation model most appropriate for
the input statistics, i.e., the stochastic relationship between
the output and input variables is chosen to minimize the rate
of information transfer.
IV. ILLUSTRATION OF RESULTS
We illustrate our results for two types of databases: one,
a categorical database and the other a numerical database.
Categorical data are typically discrete data sets comprising
of information such as gender, social security numbers and
zipcodes that provide (meaningful) utility only if they are
mapped within their own set. On the other hand, without
loss of generality numeric data can be assumed to belong
to the set of real numbers. In general, a database will have
a mixture of categorical and numerical attributes but for the
purpose of illustration, we assume that the database is of one
type or the other, i.e., every attribute is of the same kind. In
both cases, we assume a single utility (distortion) function.
We discuss each example in detail below.
Example 1: Consider a categorical database with K ≥
1 attributes. In general, the kth attribute Xk takes values
in a discrete set Xk of cardinality Mk. For our example,
we model the utility as a single distortion function of all
attributes, and therefore, it suffices to view each entry (a
row of all K attributes) of the database as generated from
a single source X of cardinality M , i.e., X ∼ p(x), x ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,M}. For this arbitrary discrete source model, we
assume that the output sample space Xˆ = X and consider
the generalized Hamming distortion as the utility function
such that the average distortion D is given by
D = E
[
d(X, Xˆ)
]
= Pr
{
X 6= Xˆ
}
. (13)
For K = 1, one can show that R(D,E) ≡ R(D) [24]; this
is because the maximum achievable equivocation is bounded
as Γ(D) = H(X)−R(D,E) ≤ H(X)−R(D) with equality
when R(D) is achievable. It has been shown by Erokhin [27]
and Pinkston [28] that R(D) is achieved by upside down
waterfilling such that
p(xˆ) =
(p(x)− λ)+∑
x∈X (p(x)− λ)
+ (14)
and the ‘test channel’ is given by
p(x|xˆ) =


D, x = xˆ
λ, x 6= xˆ, x ∈ Xˆsupp
pk, x = k 6∈ Xˆsupp
(15)
where D = 1−D, λ is chosen such that
∑
xˆ p(xˆ)p(x|xˆ) =
p(x), pk = p (x = k), and Xˆsupp = {x : p(x)− λ > 0} . The
maximum achievable equivocation, and hence, the largest
utility-privacy tradeoff region is
Γ(D) = −D logD−
∣∣∣Xˆsupp
∣∣∣λ logλ− ∑
k 6∈Xˆsupp
pk log pk. (16)
Remark 1: The distortion function chosen in (13) captures
the fact that for categorical data the utility (fidelity) of the
revealed data is reduced if any entry is changed from its
original value. The optimal upside down waterfilling solution
in (14) has the effect of ‘flattening’ the output distribution,
and thus, as in (14) the source samples with very high or
very low probabilities (relative to the waterfilling level) are
ignored (thereby minimizing the information transfer rate).
This in turn maximizes the privacy achieved since the outliers
that are easiest to infer are eliminated. Eliminating outliers,
referred to as information suppression or aggregation, is
the privacy-preserving technique of choice for the statistics
community .
Example 2: In this example we model a numerical
database. We consider a K = 2 database where both
attributes X and Y are jointly Gaussian with zero means
and variances σ2X and σ2Y , respectively, and with correlation
coefficient ρ = E [XY ] / (σXσY ). This model applies for
numeric data such as height and weight measures which are
generally assumed to be normally distributed. We assume
that for every entry only one of the two attributes, say
X , is revealed while the other, say Y , is hidden such that
Y − X − Xˆ forms a Markov chain. The rate-distortion-
equivocation region for this case can be obtained directly
from Yamamoto’s results [10] with appropriate substitution
for a jointly Gaussian source. Furthermore, due to the
Markov relationship between of X,Y, and Xˆ , the minimiza-
tion of I(X ; Xˆ) is strictly over p(xˆ|x), and thus, simplifies
to the familiar rate-distortion problem for a Gaussian source
X which in turn is achieved by choosing the reverse channel
from Xˆ to X as an additive white Gaussian noise channel
with variance D (average distortion). The maximal equivo-
cation achieved thus is
Γ(D) = σ2Y
[(
1− ρ2
)
+ ρ2D
/
σ2X
]
, D ≤ σ2X . (17)
Therefore, Γ(D) is a minimum for D = 0 (X revealed
perfectly) in which case only the data independent of X
in Y can be private, and is a maximum equal to the entropy
of Y at the maximum distortion D = σ2X . Thus, the largest
utility-privacy tradeoff region is simply the region enclosed
by Γ(D).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented an abstract model for databases with an
arbitrary number of public and private variables, developed
application-independent privacy and utility metrics, and used
rate distortion theory to determine the fundamental utility-
privacy tradeoff limits. Future work includes eliminating the
row independence (i.i.d) assumption, modeling and studying
tradeoffs for multiple query databases, and relating current
approaches in computer science and our universal approach.
An equally pertinent question is to understand whether our
formalism can be extended to study privacy-utility tradeoffs
for less structured datasets as well as social networks.
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